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JOURNAL OF ACTUARIAL PRACTICE

Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis
Patrick Butler*

Abstract
Every mile traveled by a car transfers risk to its insurer. This paper posits that
the product of a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience and the miles recorded on
the car's odometer appropriately earns prepaid premium while the car is driven.
Operation of a practical car-mile system is described briefly. To test the competing
idea that driver-record pricing responds to known large differences in risk transfer, a
model used to validate claim free discounts is reexamined with the car-mile as the
measure of individ ual cost. Driver-record pricing is found to inflate car-year price-tocost differences. Consequences of accident rate variability for a car-mile system are
reviewed. The per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property because of
the random nature of accidents. Driver-record pricing attempted on a per mile basis
would amplify differences within classes.
Key words and phrases: Per mile insurance, accident rate, risk classification, driver record
model, merit rating

1 Introduction
Cost-based pricing of individual risk is a key ratemaking principle promulgated by the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS). The principle states that "A rate provides for the costs associated with an
individual risk transfer;" see CAS (1993). The question for automobile insurance is how the cost of individual driving risk should be
measured. When a car is not being driven, its owner has no risk to
transfer for driving coverage (for all losses as a direct consequence of
the car's being driven) so the cost to its insurer is zero. Every mile a
car is driven adds to its risk of accident; the total cost of risk transfer
increases mile by mile. Both conditions point to adoption of the carmile (as opposed to the car-year that currently is used) as the unit of
* Patrick Butler holds a Ph.D. in geochemistry from Harvard University. The author
is currently director of the National Organization for Women's insurance project and
formerly was a National Aeronautics and Space Administration research scientist,
principal investigator, and the Curator of Lunar Samples. He has published papers on
geochemistry, lunar science, and automobile insurance pricing.
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risk transfer, that is, the exposure unit. Conversion of class rates from
dollars per car-year to cents per car-mile for driving coverages would
be required by a one sentence amendment to rate regulatory law proposed in several states.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the car-mile
exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk
transfer. The effect of driver-record pricing on individuals is analyzed with the car-mile unit as the objective measure of cost.

2 Car-Mile Exposure Unit
The entire entry on the exposure unit in the CAS statement of
ratemaking principles is: "The determination of an appropriate unit
or premium basis is essential. It is desirable that the exposure unit
vary with the hazard and be practical and verifiable." The currently accepted assessment of the car-mile exposure unit for automobile insurance seems to have been established by Dorweiler (1929).
Regarding the variation-with-hazard requirement, Dorweiler states:
"The mileage exposure medium is superior to the car-year medium in
yielding an exposure that varies with the hazard, as it responds
more to the actual usage of the car." Note that Dorweiler's phrase
"responds more" obscures the fact that the car-year does not respond
to actual use of the car. In addition, suspension of coverage during
periods of no use requires administrative intervention. Dorweiler further states that "[t]he devices and records necessary for the introduction of [the car-mile] medium make it impractical under present
conditions," and that while the car-year "measures the exposure
prospectively, the [car-mile] require[s] a final adjustment which
would be determined retrospectively."
Despite Dorweiler's assessment of superiority of the car-mile
exposure unit over the car-year unit in a fundamental characteristic
and his qualified judgment concerning its practicality, no substantive
actuarial reassessment has been published. Bouska (1989) updates
Dorweiler's paper and notes without comment that conversion to the
car-mile unit has been advocated by the National Organization for
Women. In a discussion of Bouska's paper, Diamantoukos (1991)
observes only that the car-mile exposure unit is "perhrps a theoretically superior one in some respects" to the car-year unit.
The National Organization for Women completed a 1992 stud y 1
for Pennsylvania legislators on operation of a car-mile system which

1 National Organization for Women. Operation of an Alldited-Mile/Year Automobile
Insurance System Under Pennsylvania Law. Washington, DC: NOW, 1992, reprinted in
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suggests that such a system would follow the odometer-limit and nontampering conditions used in mechanical breakdown insurance policies, but otherwise would not differ much from current practice. The
study follows transactions involving an example car, including a
midyear sale, for four policy years. Premium payment in advance
would be required to keep insurance protection in force. The premium
for driving coverage at car-mile rates is prepaid in mile amounts and
at times chosen by the car owner. Administrative expense and a premium for nondriving coverages are based on yearly rates and are prepaid at each policy-year renewal. Premium would be earned by the
car's insurer by the day for non driving coverages, as is currently done
for all coverages, and by the mile recorded on the odometer for driving coverages. The car's insurance ID card displays the odometer-mile
and date limits at which protection lapses pending further premium
prepayment.
Policy renewal under this plan would be conditional on taking
the car to a garage designated by the company for an annual odometer audit. The odometer would be inspected and read, and tamperevident seals would be applied at the initial audit. Theft of insurance protection is controlled because tampering with the odometeralready a federal crime-automatically voids the policy. Driving
with the cable unhooked does not steal insurance protection, because
tampering usually would be detected after an accident, and tampering
voids protection. The cents per car-mile rate would depend on coverage and the car's classification as appropriate by territory, use,
driver, and other categories.

3 Driver-Record Pricing
Advertisements such as those promIsmg "good rates for good
drivers" lead consumers to believe that accidents can be avoided and
that the important condition in individual risk of accident is how a
car is driven, not how it much it is driven. This belief is encouraged
through the use of merit ratings by automobile insurers to raise or
lower individual prices at policy renewal time.
The actuarial literature has neglected to examine the effect of
driver-record pricing on individual price-to-cost ratios where the
claim rate average for the class is taken as the price and defined
individual claim rates are taken as the costs of hypothetical individuals composing the class. Recent studies of driver records have
The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum (Summer 1993): 307-338. This study is available
from NOW, 1000 16th Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036.
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focused on general questions of variation in individual risk without
reference to pricing or cost. For example, Mahler (1991) examines the
state accident records of drivers for variation in individual risk over
time (14 years), but does not discuss how the information could be
applied to pricing automobile risk transfer. An earlier actuarial
study done for insurance regulators, however, provides information on
individual price-to-cost effects.
A widely circulated 1979 report on risk classification by insurance
company actuaries on the industry Advisory Committee to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners contains a section on
driver-record pricing. The report describes the issue of pricing individual risk transfer: "Many accidents are the result of chance. The
problem becomes-how can insurers identify the 'bad' drivers from
the 'good' drivers who were unlucky?" The impossibility of solving
this problem through driver records, although downplayed in the
report, is illustrated with a compound Poisson model composed of
specified numbers of drivers defined to have uniform high and low
annual rates of accident involvement.
In a subsequent study of driver-record pricing, Butler and Butler
(1989) analyze the high and low accident rate model in terms of the
car-mile exposure unit. They value the price-to-cost ratio for individual cars in terms of cents per mile and conclude that pricing based on
accident, claim, or traffic violation records greatly increases the
existing overpricing for unlucky owners of cars driven less than the
annual average for their risk class.
Continuing justification for driver-record pricing, however, relies
on the fact that cars whose drivers have had recent accidents (or
traffic convictions) average more accidents in a subsequent year than
do cars identically classified whose drivers have not had a recent
accident. A simplified explanation for this fact-in terms of a uniform claim rate per mile-is presented below through reinterpreta':..
tion of a classic model for a claim free discount plan. Assumption of a
cents-per-mile cost for all cars of the model provides a base for analyzing the price-to-cost effects of driver-record pricing on individual
cars. This article also considers the variation in claim rates per mile
and its consequences for classification and driver-record pricing under
a car-mile system in place of the assumed uniform claim rate per
mile.

4 Bailey & Simon Model for Claim-Record Experience
The CAS paper "An Actuarial Note on the Credibility of
Experience of a Single Private Passenger Car," by Bailey and Simon
54
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(1959) is the chief reference on the CAS examination syllabus which
shows and models the application of driver-record pricing to insurance for individual cars. Familiarity with its method of calculating
Poisson models is required for questions on the CAS exam on advanced
ratemaking; see Murdza (1992).
Bailey and Simon examine the Canadian liability claims experience of about 4 million insured car-years. The claim rate of the undivided class for each of five classes defined by car use and driver type
is compared with the rates calculated for four subclasses created by
sorting the records according to how many full years have elapsed
since the last claim was incurred by the car's drivers.
The relative effects of sorting cars by the prior claim records of
their drivers are similar for all five classes and are not affected significantly by a correction for territorial class differences. The experience for the largest Canadian class, Class 1, is shown in Table 1. The
recalculated rate relative to the claim rate for the undivided class
was 9 percent lower for the three year claim free subclass and
progressively higher with decreasing time since the last prior claim.
TABLE 1
1957-1959 Canadian Automobile Claim Data by Prior Claim Records·

Class 1
Pleasure-No Male Operator Under 25
Class
(undivided)
Number of
Claims Incurred
Car-Years
Insured
Claims Per
Car-Year

Years Since Last Prior Claim
2
1

3+

o

288,019

217,151

13,792

19,346

37,730

3,325,714

2,757,520

130,706

163,544

273,944

0.087

0.079

0.105

0.118

0.138

* Source: Bailey and Simon (1959); claim rate calculated

As part of their examination of the statistical justification for
claim free discounts, Bailey and Simon structure a model that reproduces the decrease in the claim rate observed in the Canadian data.
The model comprises cars with three annual amounts of risk transfer
representing a fourfold range in annual claim rates: 100,000 cars with
a uniform risk transfer rate of 0.05 claims per car-year (Amount I);
100,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.10 claims per car-year (Amount
II); and 50,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.20 claims per car-year
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(Amount III). The average claim rate of the model class is 0.10
claims per car-year. Bailey and Simon calculate the number of cars
that would be claim free with a Poisson distribution after three
years and combine them into a claim free subclass for each of the
defined risk transfer rates. They calculate that the average claim
rate for the new mix of the three defined rates would be 8 percent
less than the class average. A subclass reduction in claim rates
requires an offsetting claim-rate increase, however, to maintain the
overall class average.
Because the present study concerns how all cars are affected individually by the pricing of risk transfer, the Bailey and Simon model
calculations are extended here to include the subclasses with more
recent prior claims. The results are compared with the Canadian
experience in Figure 1. (Table 2 shows the calculated distribution of
cars with the three defined risk transfer rates among the four claimrecord subclasses.)
The extended model reproduces the general features of the
Canadian claim data. (Bailey and Simon point out that further
adjustment of model parameters would achieve more detailed agreement of the model with the Canadian data. For the present purposes,
however, such adjustment would add to complexity but not to understanding.) If claim rates are taken as a measure of relative insurance
prices:
•
•

The price level for the claim free majority: of cars decreases
below the rate that the undivided class would pay; and
This relatively small decrease is balanced by sharp price
increases for the minority subclasses with recent claims.

The Bailey and Simon model, by reproducing empirical claim
record insurance experience, shows the large variation in individual
risk transfer that exists within automobile insurance price classes.
Individuals in the same class are charged different prices for the
same amount of risk transfer. The Amount I cars (0.05 claims per caryear) are charged four pure premiums and Amount II cars (0.10 claims
per car-year) are charged two pure premiums for the same amount of
risk transfer that costs the Amount III cars (0.20 claims per car-year)
only one year's pure premium.

5 Risk Transfer and Miles Driven
Bailey and Simon (1960) consider reasons for the large variation
in annual risk transfer within single price classes as indicated by the
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Figure 1-Claim Rates of Prior-Claim Subclasses

Canadian Experience
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Canadian claim record experience and posited in the Bailey and
Simon 1959 model for the experience. They note that driver-record
and class plans are "quite ineffective in separating the better risks
from the poorer risks," and conclude that:
[W]e have reached the point where we may state that the still
unanalyzed cause (or causes) of variation among individual risks:
(1) has a wide dispersion, (2) varies significantly from year to
year for an individual risk, and (3) is measured only to a limited
extent by the class plan and the merit rating plan. Annual
mileage, which has long been felt to be an important measure of
hazara, fits all these requirements better than any other single
cause.
The first characteristic-dispersion of cars by annual miles
driven-is corroborated by the U. S. Department of Transportation's
nationwide personal transportation surveys. In 1977 one in five household cars was driven less than 3,000 miles, and one in ten was driven
more than 20,000 miles; see Butler, Butler, and Williams (1988, p.
376).

The second characteristic-significant individual year-to-year
variation in miles driven-is one that can be measured only by the
car's odometer. Nevertheless, Bailey and Simon do not note a need
for the car-mile exposure measure, but seem to view mileage as a
lump sum class definition from which experienced car-year cost averages are used prospectively to set base price multipliers.
The third characteristic implies that variation in risk transfer
amounts among individual cars resulting from differences in miles
driven can be measured by class and driver-record plans. Modern class
plans continue to show narrow distributions of cars by base price multiplier, in contrast to the range in miles driven; see Butler, Butler,
and Williams (1988).

6 Bailey & Simon Model With Uniform Claim Rate Per Mile
Within-class variation in individual amounts of risk transfer per
year can be seen as variation in the product of a rate variable and an
exposure variable for each car; that is, variation in the product of a
hypothetical average claim rate per mile for a car over the course of
a year and the number of miles the car is driven. The current practice
of charging annual rates for risk transfer implicitly assumes that the
two variables cannot be resolved. In a car-mile system, however, the
value of the exposure variable is recorded by each car's odometer.
The following analysis of the Bailey and Simon model assumes that

58

Journal of Actuarial Practice

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

all of the model cars share the same average risk-transfer rate,
0.00001 claims per mile. (The effect of presumed within-class differences in individual average claim rates per mile is considered later.)
The model differences in annual risk transfer amount, therefore, are
measured by the exposure variable.
The adopted claim rate per mile defines the miles per year
driven for the model's three risk amounts. For Amount I cars, 0.05
claims per year means 5,000 miles exposure per year; for Amount II
cars, 0.10 claims per year means 10,000 miles exposure per year; and
for Amount III cars, 0.20 claims per year means 20,000 miles exposure
per year. The total risk transferred at the end of 20,000 miles
traveled is the same for all cars.
TABLE 2
Model Distribution of Mile-Amount Cars by Claim-Record Subclass
Amount
of Risk
Transfer

Years Since Last Claim
MileslYear
(Each Car)

Class
(Undivided)

5,000
10,000
20,000

100,000
100,000
50,000

86,071
74,082
27,441

4,413
7,791
6,075

4,639
8,611
7,421

4,877
9,516
9,063

250,000

187,594

18,279

20,671

23,456

Avg. Miles per Car-Year

10,000

9,169

12,118

12,468

12,824

Avg. Claims per Car-Year at
0.00001 Claims per Car-Mile

0.1000

0.0917

0.1218

0.1247

0.1282

2

3+'

0

Number of Cars

I
II
III
Total cars

, Number of cars in subclass from Bailey and Simon (1959)

Bailey and Simon use their model to examine the mix of risks in
the claim free subclass. The present study extends the analysis to
obtain distributions of cars transferring the three risk amounts in the
other three claim-record subclasses, as shown in Table 2. (As only the
most recent claim is recognized by the plan, the claim-record distribution of the cars is calculated working back in time with a declining
balance of claim free cars eligible to have a claim that counts. For
example, of the 100,000 Amount I cars eligible in the 0 year, 4,877
have claims by the Poisson distribution at a 0.05 rate. The claim free
balance of 95,123 cars similarly is reduced in past year 1 and so on for
three years.) The miles-per-car-year average for each subclass is
determined by the mix of Amount I, II, and III cars.
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Although the number of cars transferring each risk amount (I, II,
and III) increases with claim recency (from 2 to 1 to 0 years since the
last claim), the number of highest mile cars (20,000 miles) increases
most rapidly. Therefore, the average miles driven is highest (12,824
miles) in the most recent claim subclass (0 years). The average of the
claim free subclass (3+ years) concurrently decreases from the class
average of 10,000 miles to 9,169 miles.

7 Accidents as Random Sampling
If it is assumed that each class has uniform average claim rates
per mile, automobile accidents in the Bailey and Simon model can be
envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road.
Accidents can sample only what is exposed. (Bias in the accident
sampling of real car-mile class populations that results from differences in the average driving conditions encountered by individual cars
is examined later in the paper.) Cars driven many miles and cars
driven few miles are included in the random accident sample of the
car-miles driven by the cars in the class. Because cars driven more
than the class average put more miles on the road, they are overrepresented in the accident sample. Cars driven less than average are
underrepresented in this sample relative to their proportion in the
class. The average miles per car of the recent claim subclasses are
increased through this random sampling process. The preferential
selection of cars driven more miles into the recent claim subclasses
also concurrently lowers (slightly) the average miles per car of the
large remaining population of cars without accidents. Because of
their greater average number of miles of exposure, therefore, the
recent claim subclasses average more claims in a subsequent year than
does the claim free subclass. All of the recent claim subclasses, however, also contain cars driven less than the class average.

8 Price-to-Cost Accuracy for Individual Risk Transfer
The miles-driven interpretation of the Bailey and Simon model
provides a cost measure in car-miles for the three individual amounts
of risk transferred. A price-to-cost relationship can be established for
the three risk transfer amounts (I, II, and III) in the undivided class
and in each of the four driver-record subclasses, a total of 15 relationships applied to the 15 groupings of cars in Table 2. (An equivalent
15 price-to-cost ratios would result from dividing the model's average
claim rates per year at the five class and subclass prices by the three
defined annual claim rates at the individual costs. Without being
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referenced to an objective standard such as odometer miles for measuring individual cost, however, the ratios would be without practical
significance. )
To picture the price-to-cost transfer comparisons, assume a classaverage cost of $10,000 per claim. This claim cost (severity) multiplied by the assumed model rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produces
a cost of 10 cents per mile pure premium for the class. Because the
average amount driven per year for the class is 10,000 miles, the 10
cents-per-mile cost makes the class cost (pure premium) $1,000 per caryear.
Despite the range in miles driven, it is assumed that all of the
cars stay in the same dollars-per-year class (as the Bailey and Simon
model implicitly assumes). This would have been the case for the
Canadian experience under the class plans of the time and is true now
for a large number of cars. Current discounts for estimated future
mileage less than 7,500 or 8,000 miles in some company class plans
are not used or have been discontinued by other automobile insurers as
intrinsically lacking in objectivity. (Because the discount difference
between 5,000 and 20,000 estimated future miles is usually about 15
percent, the adjustment would not affect the results of the analysis
significantly.)
Significantly.)
Without claim-record pricing, all individuals pay the $1,000 per
year pure premium for the class, the same premium that Amount II
cars would pay at 10 cents a mile. At a $1,000 annual rate, however,
the 20,000 mile Amount III cars pay 5 cents a mile, while the 5,000
mile Amount I cars pay 20 cents a mile, as shown by Figure 2.
When the model class is subdivided on the basis of claim records,
the proportions of cars at the three mile amounts are changed in the
four subclasses created. These new mile averages multiplied by the
assumed rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produce four new pure premiums for the claim-record subclasses: $917 for the claim free subclass
and $1,212, $1,247, and $1,282 for the progressively more recent
claims subclasses. These four annual premiums divided by the three
mile amounts in each subclass produce the 12 new prices per mile for
the model cars shown in Figure 2. The effects on the cars at the three
mile amounts are different.
The effect of claim-record pricing on the risk transfer Amount II
cars, which are individually driven 10,000 miles per year, is most
telling. Without subclassification, all Amount II cars pay 10 cents a
mile for insurance. With subclassification, most of them receive a 1
cent reduction in the cost per mile. Some cars in the class which have
had a recent claim, however, pay 2 cents to 3 cents more per mile
(Figure 2). Claim-record subclassification transforms pricing that is
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cost-based by definition for all Amount II individual cars to pricing
that is not accurate for any cars.
It could be argued that improved price-to-cost accuracy is needed
most for the model car risk transfer amounts that differ most from
the class average. Without claim-record subclassification, the cars at
the 5,000 mile amount pay 20 cents a mile, 10 cents a mile more than
the class average price. In the claim free subclass such cars receive a
2 cent per mile reduction in price. This reduction, however, is much
smaller than the 4 cents to 5 cents a mile below the class average
price that the cars at Amount III (20,000 miles) pay regardless of
their claim-record subclass. Furthermore, provision of this 2-cents-permile downward adjustment for the cars at Amount I is gained at great
cost to the Amount I cars with recent claims. For these individuals,
the 20-cent-a-mile amount they pay without claim-recency pricing is
increased 4 cents to 6 cents a mile in the recent claims subclasses. This
increase equals the entire per mile price paid by the cars at Amount
III regardless of their claim-record subclass. The only negative effect
for Amount III cars of pricing on claim record is that some lose a
small part of their per mile subsidy (Figure 2).
Statistically, a decrease in the average cost per mile paid by
Amount I cars from 20 cents to 19.3 cents coupled with an increase in
the average cost per mile paid by Amount III cars from 5 cents to 5.3
cents is evidenced in a 6 percent decrease in variance of price-to-cost
ratios from the three ratios of the undivided class to the twelve
ratios of the driver-record subclasses. The reduced variance, however,
should not mask the disparate cost of the improved statistics on
individuals that is evident in Figure 2. Driver-record pricing
increases the range in price-to-cost ratios paid by individuals in the
same class 40 percent, from a spread of 15 cents a mile before driverrecord pricing to 21 cents a mile between the lowest value for Amount
III cars and the highest for Amount I cars. Operating at random on
individuals, the so-called improvement increases the underpricing of
risk transfer for some cars already underpriced and the overpricing of
risk transfer for some cars already overpriced.

62

Journal of Actuarial Practice

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

Figure 2
Effect of Model Annual Premiums on Car-Mile Prices
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If the pricing unit were converted from car-year to car-mile so
that all of the car-owners in the model class paid the same 10 cents
per mile rate, however, each owner would pay only for the on-theroad protection the car consumed, while total premium received by
insurers would remain the same. A car driven the model class average of 10,000 miles would experience no change in the $1,000 premium
with insurance charged at car-mile rates, provided its mile amount
did not change. A car driven 4,780 miles would pay $478, while a car
driven 21,240 miles would pay $2,124.

9 Variation In Claim Rates Per Mile
The large differences in the type of risk environment that cars
can encounter are indicated by comparing statistics for accident severities and per mile accident rates between interstate highways and
city streets or between day and night driving on the same road. For
example, the injury rates per million vehicle-miles of travel ranged
from 0.36 on rural interstates to 3.0 on local urban roads in 1991; see
Federal Highway Administration (1992). In principle, therefore, the
diverse individual mixtures of car use and driving environment make
it inevitable that changes in class definition would result in different
claim costs per mile for new classes.
Accident rates per vehicle mile depend not only on traffic engineering classification of accidents experienced under roadway or other
relevant conditions during some time period, but also on determination of the number of vehicle-miles of exposure to risk that produced
the classified accidents. The same relationship holds for automobile
insurance. Only if car-miles of exposure are determined can the number and cost of claims incurred within a certain time period by a certain class of cars provide any quantitative information on the
expected risk transfer cost of each mile that cars in the class will
travel in a subsequent rating period.
As an example of the effect of classifiable per mile differences
within a business-use class of cars with adult drivers, assume two
types of car use by sales representatives. With reference to the government injury rates given above, assume that one type of use covers
the whole state and averages 0.25 claims per million car-miles
(statewide cars), while the other covers only a metropolitan area
and averages one claim per million car-miles (metro cars). Any lower
average cost per claim by the metro cars resulting from lower speed
urban accidents would narrow the effect on the claim cost per mile of
the 4:1 claim-rate difference. Separately classifying the statewide
and metro cars, provided there were enough car-miles of each usage
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type for statistical reliability, would show the differences in carmile cost.

10 Accidents as Biased Random Sampling
The analogy used above for viewing accidents as a process of sampling car-miles on the road can be extended to presumed variations
within classes in per mile accident rates. To the extent that cars are
not classified by driver age and experience according to the known
per mile differences in accident involvement for these categories, the
accident random sampling of class car-mile populations would be
biased toward the cars driven by inexperienced drivers and by
drivers near the beginning and end of the driver age range. Further,
owing to differences in driving conditions by time and place, the
accident random sample of car-miles would be biased to the cars used
more under conditions of higher risk per mile. The accident samples,
however, also will contain cars used on average under conditions of
lower risk per mile. For example, with a Poisson distribution of
claims at the rates given for the hypothetical business use cars, 18
percent of the metro cars will incur claims in 200,000 miles of driving,
but so will 4.9 percent of the statewide cars.

11 Driver-Record Pricing on a Car-Mile Basis
Like the current driver-record pricing on a car-year basis, driverrecord pricing under a car-mile exposure unit system would have an
apparent justification in cost. The inevitable bias in an accident sample assures that the subclass of cars defined as incurring a claim in
the most-recent-miles-traveled interval-within the most recent
50,000 miles, for example-will average more accidents per mile in a
following miles-traveled interval than the class average. Applying a
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however,
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase in
what is paid per mile by the recent claim cars with lower than
average claim rates compared to what they would pay if they were
classified separately. Furthermore, the higher per mile charges for
the recent claim cars with significantly higher than average claim
rates per mile still would be less than what they would pay if they
were classified separately.
Because both the claim free and recent claim subclasses of a class
are mixtures of cars with above average and below average claim
rates per mile, any action to separate them must be through class
redefinition applied to the whole class.
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12 Conclusion
CAS introduces its ratemaking principles with the specification
"[r latemaking is prospective because the property and casualty
that "[rlatemaking
insurance rate must be developed prior to the transfer of risk." In a
car-mile system, evaluation of the cost per mile to be used in a
prospective class rate can be done only on the basis of claim experience for a group of cars referenced to the group's total measured carmiles of exposure that produced the claims.
What cannot be known prospectively, because it is controlled by
individual car owners, is the amount of risk that will be transferred
through operation of each car. Although risk transfer is paid in
advance at a class rate per mile, protection is not consumed (premium
is not earned by the insurer) until the risk is transferred, mile after
mile, by driving. Conversely, premiums charged at car-year rates
invert this cost-based relationship by charging less per mile for each
mile of protection consumed, a contradiction of cost-based pricing. The
assumption that this contradiction is unavoidable on practical
grounds is not neutral. It favors all owners of cars driven more miles
per year than the average for their class.
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